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This study examines whether product specialization offers retailers
greater performance in a period of market turbulence. Incumbent
retailers of home improvement products were followed over six
years (1995-2001) comprising a period before, during, and after a
period of environmental turbulence generated by the entry of large
format retailers Home Depot and Revy to the Winnipeg market.
Data collection involved survey, interview, and observational meth-
ods of 58 participants. Niche width was operationalized using four
different methods, yet no significant difference could be found in
the performance of organizations that specialized or generalized in
home improvement products. This finding goes against much of the
cross-sectional research on product specialization and niche
strategies in retail, underscoring the importance of longitudinal
study in research on organizations.
Market analysts and strategists have offered incumbent retailers a myriad
of strategies to position themselves for market turbulence from the entry of
large-format retail stores. Yet, storeowners are still left scratching their heads,
unable to launch any meaningful response to the strategic ‘ploy’ (Mintzberg,
1987) of ‘everyday low prices’ that large-formats place in the minds of con-
sumers (Litz and Stewart, 1996; Peterson and McGee, 2000; Barber and Tietje,
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2004). The Incumbent retailers struggle with the need to select a particular
niche width that will make them competitive once again in the presence of
large-format retailers. Should they specialize, offering a narrow but deep line in
a particular area of retail home improvement products or should they general-
ize by offering a wide variety that caters to a broad array of home improvement
items?
This study followed incumbent retailers of home improvement products
over six years (1995-2001), comprising a period before, during, and after the
entry of Home Depot and Revy to the Winnipeg, Manitoba market. In 1995,
Winnipeg was a rather stable market, comprised of locally owned home
improvement stores and national retailers of moderate size. There were no
large-format sellers of home improvement products to contend with. Within
two years of the arrival of the first large-format store only two-thirds of the
incumbents remained. What characteristics did these surviving stores possess
that enabled them to compete in the same market with the large-format retail-
ers? This study utilizes literature from niche theory within population ecology
to examine the differences between firms that survived and those that failed
during the period of market turbulence experienced by incumbent retailers of
home improvement in the Winnipeg market. A brief review of literature in pop-
ulation ecology and niche width are presented with context from prior research
on large-formats in order to generate the hypothesis. Research methods, analy-
sis and findings are then presented. The paper concludes with a discussion.
Literature Review
Population ecology has its origins in biology and ecology, a concept that
regards natural selection or “survival of the fittest” as a means of explaining the
success of one organism over another by virtue of having the right combination
of characteristics to successfully adapt and thrive in their environment (Aldrich,
1979). The population ecology perspective fits well here since this study
attempts to explain why certain organizational characteristics resulted in one-
third of study participants failing. Fitness in organizations is defined as “the
probability that a given form of organization would persist in a certain envi-
ronment” (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 937). Organizations that have a ‘fit’
with the environment are better suited and therefore ‘selected’ by the environ-
ment for survival while those that are less fit fail to continue existing in their
current state and then are selected out. In the context of this study, incumbent
retailers that did not have a fit with the retail home improvement market in
Winnipeg failed.
Niche Theory
In niche theory, two similar organizations with the same environmental
requirements cannot exist in the same time and space without competition.
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Competition between existing organizations in the same environment ensues
when they compete for the same limited set of resources (Hawley, 1950;
Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Baum and Korn, 1996). Organizations that are of
greatest similarity will be in greatest competition. As a result, organizations will
vie for areas of distinction that allow them to minimize any overlap, often
exploiting a narrower set of resources not sought out by other organizations.
This narrow set of resources has been identified in organizational ecology with
terms such as a “niche” (Carroll, 1985), or “market” (Baum and Korn; 1996).
While some organizations will pursue “specialization” via niche, others will
look towards a “generalization” approach.
The distinction between specialism and generalism is often based upon
the “width of the niche” — the range of environmental dimensions across
which a population exists (Carroll, 1985); or “market domain” — the set of
markets in which a firm operates (Baum and Korn, 1996; p. 256). Porter (1996)
has characterized this activity as the “variety-based” approach for positioning
an organization – drawing upon a specific subset of an industry’s products and
services. Specialists will maximize their focus in a particularly narrow niche.
Incumbent retailers in home improvement that focus upon products such as
paint or plumbing supplies are considered “specialists” in this study. By spe-
cializing, they reduce “niche overlap” (Baum and Singh, 1994) or “domain
overlap” (Baum and Korn, 1996), thereby reducing exposure to competitive
forces, but they assume greater risk of becoming irrelevant if the environment’s
resources were to shift completely beyond their niche (Hannan and Freeman,
1977). Generalists accept a lower level of risk from shifting resources by dis-
tributing their focus over a wider niche, thereby providing a wider spectrum of
goods and services within a given environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
In return, generalists average their outcomes over a wide range of conditions.
Incumbent retailers deemed generalists in this study are stores that offer a wide
variety of products that cater to home improvements. “Generalist organizations
compete in a variety of domains simultaneously, whereas specialists focus on
only one or a limited few” (Carroll, 1985; p. 1266).
In a stable environment, generalists and specialists can find equilibrium:
specialists relying upon a narrow band of resources within an environment,
leaving the remaining environment for others; and generalists relying upon a
broad spectrum of resources, but not so much in any specific area as to be in
direct conflict with specialists. Prior to the entry of Home Depot and Revy, the
Winnipeg home improvement market would have fit the definition of “stable”
(Khandwalla, 1977). According to research in population ecology, in a stable
market, specialists will be able to out-compete generalists in their given area
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977). However, when the environment becomes unsta-
ble due to external shocks, then generalists and specialists alike are exposed to
a more turbulent environment and become vulnerable to losing necessary
resources to survive. 
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Increased competition in the market due to the entry of large-format retail
to a region would deem an environment as turbulent leading to a reduction in
performance or firm failure (Khandwalla, 1977). “The competitive environ-
ment is in continual flux, as customers, suppliers, and competitors enter and
depart, as technologies evolve, and competitive initiatives are launched and
countered in the arena” (Dess and Picken, 1999; p. 104). Heightened competi-
tion can increase the ‘niche density’ such that it affects the finite carrying
capacity of an environment. The turbulence generated by the entry of competi-
tion leads to a “shake out” (Porter, 1985) where unfit firms struggle. This
prompts an adjustment where incumbents either ‘escape’ from their original
niche (Delacroix et al, 1989), or experience organizational ‘death’ (Hannan and
Carroll, 1992). The incumbents that remain once equilibrium has been reestab-
lished comprise a population that, in general, demonstrates the best fit with the
new environment’s competition and market demand (Aldrich, 1979; Delacroix
et al, 1989; Hager, Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Pins, 1999). 
Carroll (1985, 1987) found in a study of daily newspapers that when
competition was increased beyond the carrying capacity of the market, the
death rate of generalist newspapers increased, while that of specialist newspa-
pers decreased. “Increased concentration among general dailies enhances life
chances of specialized newspapers” (Carroll, 1985; p. 1273). This would sug-
gest that, from a pre-entry standpoint, incumbent retailers that specialize should
enjoy better performance over generalists during the period of turbulence.
However, Baum and Korn (1996) found in their study of competitive rivalry of
California commuter airlines that when the degree of multi-market contact, or
domain overlap between firms increased, competition in one market was atten-
uated by the potential for retaliation in another market similarly held by the two
firms. This ‘mutual forbearance’ meant that close competitors in multi-markets
may not actually be the most intense rivals. Instead, multi-market firms may
focus upon single-market holders or specialists that possess a market domain
overlap in a single area (p. 257). This finding suggests the opposite effect from
an environmental shock from increased competition within a given ecological
niche. So, mixed signals are received on this particular characterization of the
firm.
However, in the context of retail, there appears to be greater consensus on
the discussion of specialists or generalists in the presence of increased compe-
tition. Miller, Reardon, and McCorkle (1999) found that while the entry of large
format retail may create initial market turbulence, the long term effects result
in a positive market where small retailers and large formats may coexist.
McGee and Rubach (1996) compared the effectiveness of different strategies
when 238 small independent retailers perceived the environment as ‘hostile’ or
‘benign’ following the recent arrival of Wal-Mart in their trade area. They
found that in terms of overall performance, the strategy of ‘target marketer’
(providing products that address a specific market segment or niche) was the
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best among four strategies to apply in a hostile environment (an environment
where the presence of a Wal-Mart is deemed to have made an impact on their
business). The strategy of ‘variety’ (emphasis placed upon product variety) was
rated lowest in performance. When retailers perceive their environment as
‘benign’ (the presence of a Wal-Mart is deemed to not have made an impact on
their business) the strategy of ‘target marketer’ (carrying relatively deep lines
of unique and highly recognizable products) generated the greatest net income
after tax of the three strategic approaches studied.
These findings suggest that, in both hostile and benign environments,
retailers that focus upon product depth and specialization will generate greater
performance than incumbents that engage in product breadth and variety. Litz
and Stewart (1998) found that independent retailers tend to reduce product
diversity, instead increasing upon service diversity or complexity. Furthermore,
they parallel McGee and Rubach’s (1996) findings that under high competition
situations independents tend to become more niche-oriented in their products,
opting for depth over breadth. Barber and Tietje (2004) also found that smaller
stores, in the presence of large-formats, will find market opportunities by nich-
ing. It would appear that research in retail suggests a specialist approach in the
presence of large-format retail. However, Litz and Stewart (1998) and McGee
and Rubach (1996) did not utilize longitudinal methods that included pre-entry
data collection in their research. As well, Barber and Tietje, 2004, focused on
three retail stores in a given community, two incumbents and the entering
Home Depot, while collecting consumer data two months prior to the entry of
Home Depot and then six months post entry. The sample and data collection
period may not have been sufficient to have witnessed any ‘shake out’ effects
from the entering large format retailer. 
Given the above discussion on the effect of the environment on organi-
zations, and the difference in performance found in research that categorized
organizations as “specialists” and “generalists” the following hypothesis is pre-
sented. 
Hypothesis
In the presence of market turbulence as the result of increased com-
petition from entering large-format retailers, incumbent retailers
that occupy a narrow niche will outperform incumbent retailers
that occupy a wide niche.
Methods
A significant contributing element offered by this study is the rare look
into the activities undertaken by numerous incumbent retailers at the pre-entry,
entry, and post-entry stages of a large-format retailer. Based upon my review of
the literature, no other study has looked at the impact of entering large-format
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retailers in a longitudinal analysis that includes pre-entry data with incumbent
retailers as the unit of analysis. The data for this study was collected over six
years in Winnipeg, Manitoba; a city rated as Canada’s most economically
diverse and closest in matching the overall economic diversity of Canada
(Moody’s Investors Services, 2000). The first wave of data collection, 1995,
was prior to the physical presence of Home Depot or Revy in Winnipeg.
However, rumours had already started that two large-format home improve-
ment retailers would soon become part of the local retail market. The second
wave occurred in 1997, a point at which Revy and Home Depot had entered the
market. The third period of data collection occurred in 1999, which would
reflect a point where both Revy and Home Depot had settled into the local retail
market. A fourth and final collection of data occurred in 2001. This last wave
completed three full periods of study and was limited to confirming whether or
not the remaining incumbent home improvement stores in 1999 were still in
existence, thereby determining the effect that their stated strategies in the 1999
data collection had on their operations two years hence.
The sampling frame applied for the first wave of collection (1995) was
the local yellow pages, in which firms that met the sampling criteria were ran-
domly selected for the study. The selection criteria had three requirements.
First, businesses had to have a product line that would overlap with the prod-
ucts offered by Home Depot or Revy. The product sectors in home improvement
included lumber/building supplies; paint/wall-paper/blinds; flooring/carpet/
vinyl; hardware; electrical/heating; lighting/fans; plumbing; kitchen/bathroom
cabinets; and lawn/garden. Second, the business had to operate within the busi-
ness trading area that Home Depot and Revy would be entering, which covers
about 465 square kilometers, comprising the geographical area of the city of
Winnipeg. Third, retail sales had to account for more than half of the business
generated by the store. 
In total, 72 retailers were contacted in T1 (1995) to participate in the
study. Of the 72, data were received from 58 stores, for a response rate slight-
ly over 80%. Sampling in subsequent waves of data collection (1997, 1999 and
2001) was limited to participants in the initial wave of data collection.
Therefore, periods of data collection after the first wave (T1) were limited to
the initial 58 participants. However, initial criteria still had to be maintained for
a participant to remain in the study. If, for example, a study participant relocat-
ed to an area beyond the region in the study they would be deemed as having
exited the competing market area and that would have been noted as a failure
to compete with the large-format stores.
Over the span of the study, 20 of the 58 stores experienced firm failure,
terminating their competition with the big box stores. At T2 (1997) twelve of
the 58 incumbent stores had failed. By T3 (1999), eight more failed. A fourth
survey in 2001 found that the incumbent population had stabilized, with total
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firm failure remaining at twenty. The total failure rate for the duration of the
study was slightly under 35% (34.48%).
Data collection involved survey, interview, and observational methods.
The application of the three methods allowed for triangulation of data
(McGrath, 1982), generating support for findings collected in each of the three
methods, as well as offering a richness of detail not necessarily found when
limited to fewer methods. The results should increase the ability to draw con-
clusions from the study (Scandura and Williams, 2000). For example, state-
ments made by storeowners could be compared against corresponding data
found in the survey or by observations made onsite. 
Dillman’s Total Design method (1978) was utilized in order to develop
and administer the survey instrument. With the help of a trained research assis-
tant familiar with the home improvement industry, pilot testing of the 1995 sur-
vey was performed on a few Winnipeg businesses and later refined, dropping
or adjusting questions as necessary. The survey instrument adopts the format
designed by Litz and Stewart (1996) as a template, with the intent of gaining
understanding of each retailer’s products offered, customers served, and prior
year’s performance.
Operationalization of Independent Variables
Niche width has been applied in a variety of industries, with the bases for
a firm’s degree of generalization or specialization being reliant upon relevant
contextual knowledge of their industry (Carroll et al, 2002). This has resulted
in a myriad of ways to categorize niches across industries. Litz (1997) report-
ed that firms could niche along five distinct bases, one of which includes prod-
uct/service characteristics (p. 15). Porter (1980) stated that one of the most
effective methods in which firms could specialize is to focus upon “a tightly
constrained group of products” (p. 208). Moreover, Porter (1985) instructed
that to identify particular product types or ‘segments’ an individual should iso-
late all products based upon physical distinction. For the purpose of this study,
home improvement products were distinguished along fourteen different cate-
gories based upon the products offered by Home Depot or Revy, including seg-
ments such as building hardware, tools, plumbing and lumber: The more that a
firm focused upon a particular segment, the narrower their niche. Based upon
this distinction, four different methods of establishing a firm’s niche were
developed; specialists and generalists, retail store typology, niche focus, and
niche width score.
Specialists and Generalists
Population ecologists have characterized organizations as generalists or
specialists for several decades (particularly following Hannan and Freeman,
1977) in order to discuss competition among organizations that differ along a
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single environmental dimension (niche width). I applied this method in catego-
rizing retail home improvement stores and classified each store, based upon
their reported product variety, and my knowledge of the industry. This combi-
nation provided the sufficient institutional information to assign the product
niche of retail home improvement stores, which is an accepted approach to
niche categorization (Dobrev et al, 2001). Retailers in this study were deemed
specialists if their products mainly focused upon any one of the fourteen prod-
uct areas identified in the survey with limited variation. Examples of specialist
firms are paint stores, or flooring. Generalist stores would provide a wider
focus in products, crossing into multiple product types. Examples of generalists
would be general home improvement stores or merchandisers that cross into
multiple product categorizations.
The number of specialists dropped from 40 at T1 to 32 at T2. By the end
of the study 27 remained. The failure rate of specialists was 32.50%.
Generalists reduced from 18 (T1) to 14 (T2), stopping at 11 by T3, for a failure
rate slightly below 39% (38.9%). In a Chi-square test, no significance was
found for the distribution of generalists and specialists across incumbents that
survived or failed.
While the most frequently used categorization of organizational forms is
as specialists or generalists, researchers have called for alternative methods of
classification (Baum, 1996), stating that there are various alternative methods
(Usher and Evans, 1996). Carroll (1985) has argued that it is “essential to
define units of analysis that represent arenas within which most competitive
action occurs. (p. 1268). This study explores alternative methods of categoriza-
tion based upon the width of the band of resources that organizations choose to
exploit in a given environment in order to reflect the notion of variety-based
positioning.
Retail Store Typology
Retail store type is a less coarse-grained categorization of retail stores
than the specialist and generalist distinction. Retail type is determined by
assigning each incumbent retailer the classification that Miller, Reardon and
McCorkle (1999) arrived at following their review of store classification types.
Upon their review, Miller et al voiced concern for the imprecision present in
extant classifications, which they believe may lead to nonexclusive categoriza-
tion. They prepared a retail categorization that identifies retail stores as one of
three types: “limited-line specialists”, “broad-line specialists”, and “general
merchandisers,” taking into account the consistency that is present in the end-
use of product lines that a retailer offers.
Limited-line specialists “offer the highest level of consistency of product
lines” (p. 108) and in the context of this study, would relate to stores catering
to a specific line of products, such as paint or flooring. Forty of the 58 partici-
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pating retailers were assigned the category of limited-line specialists. Broad-
line specialists provide a “broader level of consistency of product lines” (p.
108) thus offering complementary products towards a similar end-result. An
example of a similar end-result would be retailers that offer products that would
support a full home renovation, yet, would not extend to products external to
the generic end-result, such as automotive products. Thirteen out of the 58
stores were identified as broad-line specialists. General merchandisers offer
“relatively inconsistent product lines” (p.108), providing products that satisfy
needs that are not necessarily complementary in end-use. Five of the stores
were identified as general merchandisers.
The number of limited line specialists dropped from 40 at T1 to 32 at T2.
By the end of the study 27 remained. The failure rate of limited-line specialists
was 32.50%. Broad line specialists reduced from 13 (T1) to 9 (T2), stopping at
6 at T3, for a failure rate slightly below 54% (53.85%). General merchandisers
remained steady at five stores throughout the study. In a Chi-square test, no sig-
nificance was found in this categorization with incumbents that survived or
failed.
Niche Focus
The third method of categorization recognizes the possibility that subtle
variation in the width of a band of resources may exist among organizations
within a particular ecological niche. Given this variation, organizations are
given a fine-grained continuous measure based upon their product niche width
(Dobrev et al, 2001); the greater an organization focuses upon a particular line
of products, the narrower their niche width. This measure relied upon the
responses of retailers regarding the percentage of each product category they
reportedly sold in their store, and reduces the potential for any bias I may have
introduced in the first two niche categorizations.
The extent that a retailer focused upon a single product line was deter-
mined and labeled as the ‘niche focus.’ Store participants were asked to allocate
the percentage of products sold in their store. At T1, The categories included
building hardware, tools, electrical supplies, plumbing, lumber plywood, gar-
dening supplies and tools, kitchen cabinetry, flooring, paint and wallpaper,
lighting fixtures, yard and garden furnishings, housewares, appliances, and
other. Participants could choose percentage blocks for each product type, rang-
ing from 0%, increasing in blocks of ten percent (1-9%, 10-19%, 20-29% and
so on).
A retailer’s niche focus was assessed based upon their reported allocation
of the most products sold in a given category as compared to the sum of all
products sold. The niche focus was determined based upon the maximum value
reported over the sum of all the products sold in the same time period:
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[Largest Product Category / Sum of all Product Categories = Niche Focus]
The range of niche focus ran between ‘0’ and ‘1.0’. The higher the value
resulting from this equation suggested a greater niche focus by the retailer. A
low value would mean that the retailer sells products in many different cate-
gories, suggesting a wide niche or generalist approach. T1 niche focus (N=57)
had a mean ratio of .7568. The mean generated for T2 (N=38) was .7401. The
T3 (N=37) ratio was .7518.
Niche Width Score
In this fourth classification, Miller et al’s (1999) retail typology is com-
bined with the fine-grained niche focus measure, which is derived from an
incumbent retailer’s reported product variety, to create a niche width score.
Retail store typology is multiplied by the niche focus value:
[Retail Type x Niche Focus = Niche Width Score]
The two measures create a new measure where values are distributed
anywhere on a scale from “0” to “3.0”. The narrower the retailer’s focus, the
greater the niche width score, suggesting a highly specialized approach to pro-
viding products in retail home improvement. The mean niche width score at T1
(N=57) was 2.0870. At T2 (N=38) the mean was 2.0597, and at T3 (N=37) the
mean increased to 2.1122. Over time, the mean niche width score of incum-
bents increased.
Operationalizing of Dependent Variables
The following two dependent variables are performance-related outcome
measures. The first measure looks at firm failure while the second is a subjec-
tive performance measure, reported performance.
Firm Failure
Firm failure offers an important measure that is based upon the firm’s
ability to maintain operations in light of turbulence from the entry of large-for-
mat competition. There are several ways that a firm can be marked as failing to
maintain its presence in the given market. The store could experience organi-
zational ‘death’ (Hannan and Carroll, 1992), terminating their competition with
the big box stores by closing their doors. Also, the incumbent could ‘escape’
(Delacroix et al, 1989) by 1) being acquired by another incumbent, 2) relocat-
ing their business outside the study or market area, or 3) altering their products
so as not to have a competitive overlap with the big box stores. In either method
of firm exit (death or escape), they provide a valuable proxy for measuring the
intensity of competitive rivalry (Baum and Korn, 1996). Usher and Evans
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(1996) treated migrations out of an ecological niche as failures. Baum and Korn
(1996) stated that failure includes “exit by [a] losing firm or exit by a firm that
chooses to yield to the dominant rival in that market without ever engaging in
competition” (p. 258). Therefore, exit as avoidance of heightened competition
(in this study, incumbent retailers that exit prior to the entry of large-formats at
T2) has also been considered an example of firm failure. This is particularly
important, given that this study includes pre-entry as part of the longitudinal
data collection. For the purpose of this study, any of the above methods of ter-
minating competition are denoted as firm failure.
Over the span of the study, 17 of the 58 stores experienced organization-
al ‘death,’ terminating their competition with the big box stores by closing their
doors. Only three ‘escaped’ either by being acquired by another incumbent
(N=1), relocating their business outside the study area (N=1), or altering their
products/services to avoid a competitive overlap with the big box stores (N=1). 
Incumbent retailers that were noted as ‘failed’ at T2, were assigned a T2
Fail value of ‘1’. Incumbent retailers that were noted as ‘failed’ at T3, were then
assigned a T3 Fail value of ‘1’. If a firm survived through all periods of data
collection, then their T2 Fail and T3 Fail values would both be ‘0’ (there were
no failures recorded at T4).
Reported Performance Measure
While failure provides the ultimate measure in an incumbent’s ability to
navigate a turbulent period, Dess and Robinson (1984) argue “success or fail-
ure offers little condolence to the manager of a small firm moving toward mem-
bership in the latter group” (p. 266). Yet the practice of using failure has large-
ly been due to the difficulty in retrieving financial information from often pri-
vately held smaller firms in order to generate objective performance measures.
In lieu of objective measures of performance from all participants, the alterna-
tive is to rely upon subjective reports to generate performance results of firms.
However there is concern that managers may inflate their profits, or downplay
their losses. Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) have found that organizations,
which display overconfidence and a feeling of invulnerability, can goad them-
selves into staying the course during a period of turbulence, ultimately entering
into a death spiral. Clarke and Perrow (1999) suggest that organizations may
have a plan to deal with events that precipitate failure, however these plans
merely amount to ‘fantasy documents,’ particularly if generated by managers
that have never experienced what they are planning for (such as embarking
upon large-format competition). In both cases, management would have dis-
closed positive performance reports, yet still result in firm failure. Still, in lieu
of acquiring objective measures, subjective measures are a suitable alternative
and have been reported as highly consistent with objective internal and exter-
nal measures (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987).
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Subjective outcome items were collected in the survey, comprising a
series of questions that aimed at understanding the firm’s past, present and
future sales levels, profit and growth rate:
1. How satisfied are you with your store’s current performance in each of
the following areas (1 = “very unsatisfied”...5 = “very satisfied”)?
a. sales levels
b. net profit
c. sales growth rate
2. How have each of the following changed for your store over the past five
years (1 = “significant decrease”…5 = “significant increase”)?
a. sales levels
b. net profit
c. sales growth rate
3. What changes do you expect for your store over the next five years
(1 = “significant decrease”…5 = “significant increase”)?
a. sales levels
b. net profit
c. sales growth rate
Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the above items, extracting
principle components with an Eigenvalue over 1.0. Direct oblimin rotation was
applied in the analysis since the items are related.
The factor accounting for the greatest percentage of variance (37.667%)
had six of the items (1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c) load together with an Eigenvalue of
3.997. This measure was identified as ‘reported performance’. The mean of
three or more of the six reported performance items are used to form the total
score for reported performance in each time period with a range between a low
of ‘0’ and high of ‘5.0’. By taking the mean of only three of the six items it is
possible to maximize the number of cases represented in the analysis.
Reliability analysis conducted on the measures for reported performance pro-
vided acceptable Cronbach’s alpha scores to use in the study: T1 (alpha = .88),
T2 (alpha = .92), and T3 (alpha = .89).
Analysis
A One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (K-S Test) was conducted to
test the distribution of each of the independent variables. Each test resulted in
a significant finding (p < .100), indicating that the independent measures are
not normally distributed (see Table 1). Attempts to normalize the data, utilizing
a variable’s natural log or square root generated were not successful. Testing of
the hypothesis therefore utilized non-parametric methods.
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Table 1: Tests of normal distribution for independent variables.
The first series of tests utilized the simple differentiation between ‘spe-
cialists’ and ‘generalists,’ followed by the categorization of ‘limited-line,’
broad-line,’ and ‘general merchandisers.’ A third series examined the niche
focus as outlined earlier, concluding with analysis that combined niche focus
and retail store type for a measure labeled as ‘niche width score.’ The results of
the test generated no significance in any of the outcome measures.
Specialists and Generalists
An initial series of cross-tabulations were conducted to determine if there
were any significant differences between specialists and generalists that sur-
vived and failed. There were no significant differences in firm failure or report-
ed performance found between stores identified as generalists and specialists.
This suggests that the distinction between the two store types does not neces-
sarily offer any difference in competitive advantage. Further testing of these
variables was conducted utilizing Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests to determine
if significant findings may be present in a more fine-grained non-parametric.
The findings in the Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests however confirm the cross-
tabulations conducted. No significant differences could be found in firm failure
or reported performance between stores identified as specialists or generalists.
Retail Store Typology
An initial Chi-Square test was conducted on surviving stores to determine
if there was any significant difference in any retail store type from the overall
rate of failure. Then cross-tabulations were carried out using only incumbent
retailers identified as limited-line and broad-line retail. However, both the one-
Generalists and Type of Degree of Competitive
Specialists Retail Nicheness Fitness Score
N 58 58 57 57
Normal Parameters a.b. Mean 1.6897 2.6034 .7568 2.0870
Std. Deviation .4667 .6473 .2416 .9297
Most Extreme Absolute .437 .420 .168 .215
Differences Positive .253 .260 .157 .163
Negative .437 -.420 -.168 -.215
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.325 3.196 1.269 1.626
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .080 .010
a.  Test distribution is Normal.
b.  Calculated from data.
Gaudes
25
sample Chi-square test and the cross-tabulations were unable to find any sig-
nificant difference in firm failure. Given the overall survival rate, the expected
survival rate of each retail type did not differ significantly. The remainder of the
testing of retail type was conducted utilizing Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests.
The M-W tests produced no findings that would suggest that any difference in
retail type produces a more favourable market position. The distinction of a
limited-line, broad-line, or general merchandiser has produced no significant
difference in firm failure or reported performance.
Niche Focus
Testing of the scalar measure niche focus was conducted by utilizing the
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests to determine if significant findings may exist.
The M-W tests produced no findings that would suggest any difference in niche
focus would produce greater performance.
Niche Focus Score
Testing of the scalar measure niche width score was conducted by utiliz-
ing the Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests to determine if significant findings may
exist. However, the Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests produced no findings that
would suggest that any difference in the niche width score of incumbent retail-
ers produces a more favourable niche in the market using either firm failure or
reported performance.
Summary
The hypothesis in this study suggests that firm performance can be
explained in part by the niche width of incumbent retailers. This was support-
ed by literature in population ecology and prior studies on turbulent environ-
ments and the impact of entering large-format retailers. Four different methods
of defining niche width were tested in order to see if different approaches yield-
ed different results. Analysis of the data has provided overwhelming evidence
that categorization or distinction of incumbent retailers of home improvement
by virtue of the breadth of products does not lead to any significant difference
in outcome measures associated with performance (firm failure, reported per-
formance). The data does not provide any statistical support for the hypothesis.
These findings are surprising given the preponderance of prior research that
state to the contrary. Specialists are expected to outperform generalists in tur-
bulent environments. However here, not only was I unable to attain statistical
significance, the direction of the relationship between niche width and firm per-
formance was not consistent from one test to the next.
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Discussion
This research utilizes literature on niche theory to offer explanation on
the performance of incumbent retailers in the presence of market turbulence
due to competition by entering large-format retail. Suggestions that niching cre-
ates superior performance in the presence of market turbulence were the foun-
dation for the hypothesis. 
The results of the analysis generated findings, which were not fully antic-
ipated, casting doubt on some of the research literature or possibly on the meth-
ods that were previously applied in order to generate their findings. Distinction
of retailers by virtue of their niche width, as operationalized in the four differ-
ent ways in this study, generated no significant difference in the success or fail-
ure of retailers. Furthermore, the fact that four approaches to describing the
width of a retailer’s niche all ended with no significant relationship to firm per-
formance means that for this study, discussions on specializing based upon a
variety-based position will not ensure good performance in a period of market
turbulence.
Prior research in large-format retail has largely taken the stance that spe-
cializing, or exploiting a narrow band of resources provides optimal position-
ing in a period of turbulence. However, a key difference between the prior stud-
ies and this one is the inclusion of pre-entry incumbent store data to draw from
in the analysis stage. If the environment had reached stability by T3 (which is
assumed, since no firm failures occurred in the sample after T3, then market
equilibrium has been reached. If that is the case, and if exit by incumbents prior
to entry by large-formats is deemed avoidance of competition (Baum and Korn,
1996), then the least fit organizations may have actually exited the study mar-
ket area prior to Home Depot and Revy entering. This would suggest that some
of the richest information on firm failure and competition in the presence of
large-formats occurred at pre-entry. In an attempt to replicate previous studies
of entering large-formats, a Chi-square test was conducted on the hypothesis
using only data that could have been gathered from incumbent retailers that
were in existence at T2 and T3, leaving out all data from T1, including the
twelve firms that had failed by the time Home Depot and Revy had entered the
market. The tests generated significant results (p ≤ ,100), suggesting that spe-
cializing would offer superior performance.
This exercise underscores the critical importance of longitudinal data col-
lection when conducting research on organizational change at the population
level. As Miller et al (1999) have stressed “competition is by its nature, a lon-
gitudinal construct” and “further examination [longitudinally] is needed” (p.
119). As well, because this study is longitudinal, it provided an opportunity to
have an examination of incumbent retailers that includes firm failure as an out-
come variable. This offered a look into the pre-existing conditions of incumbent
retailers that resulted in firm failure. It also offered a response to prior calls for
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study on the impact of different strategic positions made by incumbent retailers
and whether their actions (or inaction) has led to firm failure (Miller et al, 1999;
McGee and Rubach, 1996). Furthermore, including firms that experience firm
failure eliminates implicit bias of studying only surviving firms, which has
been noted as a research limitation by authors in prior studies (Litz and Stewart,
1996; Peterson and McGee, 2000).
A major limitation of this study however is the low number of partici-
pants in the data. This could explain why it was not possible to generate a nor-
mal distribution in the independent variables used. However, where this data-
set lacked in number of participants, it gained in having the data collected at
four points over six years. Regarding construct measurement, the measures
used in testing niche width may not have provided sufficient representation of
a niche being narrow or wide. Still, some significant results were generated
when the analysis did not include T1 data. However, assigning a niche width
based upon coarse grain ‘specialist’ and ‘generalist’ categorizations; the con-
sistency of the end use of products; a mathematically derived value of niche
based upon the products sold, or any combination of the above may not be reli-
able measures of niche width.
As well, Generalizability of the findings must also be considered. While
the niche dimensions described here could be applied in other retail environ-
ments the product variety and industry activities of the sector that the tests were
undertaken in are fairly specific to the industry of home improvement.
Finally, we must accept that not all fit firms survive, and not all unfit
firms fail. Aldrich (1979) stated “just as the fittest sometimes fail, because of
random variations in the selection process, so patently maladaptive organiza-
tions sometimes survive” (p. 54). Here as well, some organizations that are not
fit will close their doors for reasons not accountable in the hypothesis generat-
ed.
Although I have explored the position of retailers based upon variety-
based positioning; one of three distinct sources as identified by Porter (1996),
I have not looked at needs-based positioning – tailoring a set of products to best
serve the needs of its target customers, or access-based positioning – configur-
ing activities so that they are optimal in reaching the buyer. Initial study under-
taken with this data set shows promise for significant differences in store per-
formance based upon needs-based positioning. As well, prior research in retail
has looked at access-based positioning, suggesting how stores may create
advantages by increasing accessibility via location and store hours and there-
fore convenience to consumers. Longitudinal research that attends to the eval-
uation and interrelation of needs-based and access-based positioning of retail-
ers is required so that we can confirm that positions recommended by past stud-
ies are still relevant.
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